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Abstract 
In this paper we examine factors that make some governments revert 
to procyclical fiscal policies despite the standard normative prescription 
being to conduct fiscal policy countercyclically. In order to avoid the pitfalls 
of the two-step methods previous studies have typically used we used a one-
step method with interaction variables. We found robust statistical evidence 
that procyclical fiscal policies are typically run by countries with weak 
institutions. There was also some empirical support for a hypothesis that 
countries that have accumulated a high debt-to-GDP ratio tend to run 
procyclical fiscal policies, possibly as a result of the financial constraints. 
We found no evidence that any other variable among the ones suggested in 
the literature explains the way in which governments react to the business 
cycle. 
JEL classification: E60, E63; keywords: procyclical fiscal policy, financial 
constraints, fiscal institutions; this version: November 2008 
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INTRODUCTION 
The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy has been subject to numerous theories and 
studies. According to the standard normative approach, fiscal policy should respond 
countercyclically to the business cycle. That is, the deficit should increase during economic 
downturns, whilst surplus should be generated during the upswings. Such behaviour remains 
in line with both the standard Keynesian prescriptions and the tax-smoothing theory of Barro 
(1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983). A growing body of literature suggests also that it is 
beneficial to limit the countercyclical policy to automatic stabilisers and to refrain from 
additional discretionary actions, due to their relatively small multipliers (Perotti 2002), 
possible non-Keynesian effects (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990; Alesina et al. 2002), and 
unavoidable implementation lags. 
The recent literature shows, however, that such behaviour by fiscal authorities is not 
common. Gavin et al. (1996) were the first to observe that in most Latin American countries 
limited access to international capital markets has resulted in sharply procyclical fiscal 
policies, which, additionally, augmented their macroeconomic volatility. Catao and Sutton 
(2002) confirmed this result with respect to other low-income countries. Talvi and Vegh 
(2000) observed that while fiscal policies turn out to be procyclical in most low- and middle-
income countries, in the G7 states they remain generally in line with the normative 
prescriptions. Lane (2003), Calderon, Duncan, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003; 2004) and 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) reached similar conclusions. 
Different authors have offered alternative theoretical interpretations for these results. 
Chronologically the first one is the theory of financial restraints, proposed by Gavin et al. 
(1996), Calderon et al. (2003) and Calderon and Schmidt (2003). According to this concept, 
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the main factor that limits governments’ abilities to react countercyclically is the credit 
rationing imposed by investors, which becomes particularly severe during economic 
downturns. In line with this reasoning, it is argued that less-developed countries are generally 
more prone to run pro-cyclical policies, due to higher risk and limited access to international 
capital markets. 
Other theories that try to explain the observed procyclicality put stress on the 
institutional and social characteristics of the countries. Authors of these theories derive 
procyclical fiscal policies from game-theoretic models, typically in a common-pool setting, 
that encompass interactions between voters, groups of interest, political actors and investors. 
The determinants of cyclical behaviour of the fiscal authorities are output volatility and 
dispersion of political powers (Tornell and Lane 1998, 1999 and Lane 2003), corruption 
(Alesina and Tabellini 2005), or polarisation of preferences (Woo 2006). 
There is a considerable body of empirical research available in support of this group 
of theories. Virtually all the aforementioned authors presented some econometric evidence in 
favour of the preferred explanation. However, according to our knowledge, the available 
theories have not been confronted directly using the same data set, which does not allow to 
compare their explanatory power. Moreover, two methodological problems are common in 
the existing studies. The widely used method is a two-step procedure that encompasses 
estimating an indicator of fiscal cyclicality country-by-country using time series models, and 
then finding determinants of such indicators, using cross-sectional equations. As Canova and 
Pappa (2005) pointed out, such a method is likely to be biased and tends to overestimate the 
true effect. The second issue is the use of ratio of deficit to GDP as a central fiscal indicator, 
which may lead to overestimating the size of cyclical effects in countries with large public 
sectors. Since the size of the public sector is likely to be correlated with the institutional 
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characteristics, such a misspecification is likely to bias the results, while the sign of bias is 
difficult to assess a priori. 
Comparing the explanatory power of different theories that explain the phenomenon 
of procyclical fiscal policies, whilst avoiding the abovementioned methodological problems, 
is the objective of this paper. It does so using the panel data for 32 countries, mainly the 
members of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in years 
1980-2005. We found evidence that countercyclical fiscal policies are typically run by 
countries with better institutions, measured by the “Regulation of Credit, Labor, and 
Business” component of the Gwartney and Lawson’s (2005) Economic Freedom of the 
World index. There was also some empirical support for a hypothesis that countries that 
accumulated high debt-to-GDP ratio tend to run procyclical fiscal policies, possibly as a 
result of the financial constraints imposed by the investors. We did not find evidence that any 
other variable among the ones included in the study explains the way governments react to 
the business cycle. 
The first section presents the key issues in measuring the impact of the business cycle 
on fiscal variables. The second section reviews the potential determinants of fiscal cyclicality 
that can be derived from different theories. It also discusses the proposed methodology of 
testing their explanatory power. The third section presents results of the empirical analysis. 
The last section concludes. 
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I. THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOUR OF FISCAL POLICY 
I.1. Choice of the Dependent Variable 
In the analysis of cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy, it is crucial to properly define 
the indicator of fiscal stance. Three variables, fiscal balance, the cyclically adjusted fiscal 
balance, and public spending, are typically used for this purpose. All three measures typically 
refer to the consolidated general government sector, while in some studies, mainly due to the 
availability of comparable data, the central government surplus is used instead. 
The first measure, fiscal balance, is the most commonly used indicator of fiscal 
policy. Its main advantage is that it fully reflects the impact of the public sector on domestic 
savings and domestic demand. It has, however, also at least two crucial drawbacks. Firstly, it 
includes interest payments, a type of expenditure that is independent from the government’s 
decisions, at least in the short run. It rather reflect the behaviour of investors on the one side, 
and the past behaviour of the governments on the other. A simple solution to this problem is 
using the primary surplus, instead of the total surplus. Secondly, fiscal surplus it is a poor 
measure of the fiscal authorities’ discretionary actions, since it depends strongly on the phase 
of the business cycle. To control for this dependence, the cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus is 
often used instead as a measure of fiscal stance. However, a vast literature concerning the 
methodology of fiscal adjustment (see, for example, Banca d’Italia 1999) points at 
fundamental problems with this type of indicator. Neither it can be measured directly and no 
commonly accepted methodology exists, therefore putting this measure to a large extent 
under the discretion of the researcher. 
An alternative approach is to use public expenditure, usually as a ratio of gross 
domestic product (GDP), as the central measure of fiscal policy. Since state expenditure only 
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weakly depend on output (the impact of the business cycle is limited to, usually small, 
unemployment-related benefits), this indicator can be directly used as the measure of fiscal 
stance. However, this indicator does not give the full picture of the impact of fiscal policy on 
domestic demand. It is also a poor measure of fiscal discretion, since it ignores the revenue 
side of the budget, while for some governments changes of the tax system are an important 
instrument of shaping the fiscal policy within the business cycle. 
We should, hence, choose an indicator that covers possibly all the government’s 
operations. This is crucial, since the fiscal authorities may tend to move some expenditure 
items to extra budgetary funds, particularly if they are subject to the fiscal rules. The ideal 
measure should also encompass both expenditure and revenue side of public finances in 
order to cover any kinds of discretionary actions that change overall fiscal stance. It should 
also be possibly simple and insensitive to the discretionary choices concerning methodology, 
automatic stabilizers, and to the exogenous changes of the costs of servicing the public debt. 
One can easily show that none of the standard fiscal indicators fulfils all the criteria. In order 
to have both simple and comprehensive measure, we decided to use the primary surplus of 
general government as the main measure of fiscal stance. We address the issue of cyclical 
sensitivity indirectly, through including the output gap in the econometric model. 
I.2. Measuring Impact of the Business Cycle: Methodological Issues 
It is a common practice in the empirical literature to use the ratio of fiscal surplus to 
GDP as the measure of fiscal stance. In order to control for the impact of the business cycle, 
this indicator is then regressed on the output gap (a percentage deviation of GDP from its 
trend). Hence, a typical equation of ratio of fiscal surplus (Sit) to GDP (Yit), for country i at 
time t, takes the form: 
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(1) it1ititit01it1it1iitit )1Y/Y()Y/S(Y/S +′+−++= −− x ,  
where itY  denotes the potential output, xit is a vector of other control variables, and 
it is a disturbance term. However, using such a specification results in considerable 
drawbacks. It implicitly assumes unitary elasticity, which does not have to be true, especially 
in the short run, in the presence of progressive taxation. A more serious problem is that it 
overestimates the reaction to the business cycle fluctuations in the countries with larger 
public sector, while tends to underestimate it in countries where governments are small. To 
see this, imagine two countries, A and B, that are characterized by public revenues 
proportional to output, expenditures insensitive to the business cycle and the fiscal authorities 
that refrain from any discretionary decisions. The only difference is the size of the public 
sector h (the ratio of revenue to GDP), so that hA < hB. Then For 1 percentage point change of 
output gap leads to change of the ratio of surplus to GDP, by hA and hB, respectively. This 
creates a misleading picture that country B runs a stronger countercyclical policy, while, in 
fact, fiscal authorities in both countries behave in a neutral way with respect to the business 
cycle.  
In order to deal with these problems, Lane (2003) and Woo (2006) used an alternative 
specification: 
(2) itit1iit )Ylog()Glog( ++= ,  
where Yit denotes real GDP and Git are fiscal expenditures. While their approach 
solves the issue of potentially non-unitary elasticities, it is still sensitive to the problem of 
different-sized public sectors. Moreover, the first-differencing can remove only the linear 
trend from the variables, while in order to remove any other form of trend typically present in 
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GDP, some more flexible filtering technique, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter, is 
necessary. 
I.3. Baseline Specification 
In order to solve all the abovementioned problems in a consistent way, we use an 
alterative approach. The equations that model key fiscal variables, general government real 
expenditure (excluding interest payments) G and revenue H (for the country i at year t), take 
the form:  
(3) Gititit )y~(GG =   Hititit )y~(HH = ,  
where G  and H  denote, respectively, the structural levels of expenditure (also 
excluding interest payments) and revenue, while ity~  is the output gap, defined as the ratio of 
actual to potential GDP. The E  and H  are short-run output elasticities of expenditure and 
revenue. If g = G/Y, h = H/Y (and, respectively, Y/Gg = , Y/Hh = ), then these identities 
can be re-written as:  
(4) 1ititit G)y~(gg −=   1ititit H)y~(hh −= . 
Unlike the conventional approach, we define the general government surplus as the 
ratio of revenue to expenditure1. This definition, together with (4), allows us to formulate the 
following equation of (primary) fiscal surplus: 
                                                 
1
 This is approximately equal 1 plus the ratio of conventional surplus (the difference between 
revenue and expenditure) and expenditure. 
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(5) )y~ln()()g/hln()g/hln( itGHitititit −+= .  
The expression )( GH −  in this equation is the measure of cyclical budget 
elasticity, and later in this text will be denoted as S.2 This formulation allows us to avoid the 
problem of comparing fiscal cyclicality in countries with different size of the public sector. 
In the example of two countries, A and B, such a specification will show that in both of them 
cyclical budget elasticity is the same and equals 1. It also addresses two other problems of 
the conventionally used specification: it allows for both non-unitary elasticities of revenue 
and expenditure, as well as for a non-linear trend in GDP time series. 
An important issue is modelling the behaviour of structural part ( )g/hlog( itit ) in 
equation (5). We assume that it can be modelled as an autoregressive process of order N, 
with a number of additional control variables. It is reasonable to expect that structural surplus 
is correlated with both present and past values of the output gap. Such a relationship reflects 
the existence of the authorities’ underlying cyclical reaction function. The governments often 
declare that their objective is to keep full employment, which implicitly means actively 
managing the structural surplus in order to keep output gap close to 0. On the other hand, the 
aforementioned empirical results and theories demonstrate that in many cases they fail to do 
so, aggravating cyclical fluctuations through procyclical fiscal policies. We should, hence, 
allow for a presence of a cyclical reaction function. At this point, as a baseline case, we 
                                                 
2
 More strictly, S is the short-run output elasticity of budget balance, measured as the ratio of 
revenues to expenditures. If it is close to 0, then the budget balance is insensitive to short-run changes 
in GDP. When it is close to 1, a change of output gap by 1 percent of GDP causes a change of budget 
balance by  percent of GDP, where  is approximately equal to the share of public revenues in GDP 
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assume it to be a constant, dynamic process of order up to M, while further in the paper we 
allow it also to change both between countries and across time.  
In addition to output, structural surplus is likely to depend on a number of other 
variables. The one typically used in the literature is inflation (Woo 2006). Many of budgetary 
items are indexed to price growth, hence (both expected and unexpected) changes in rate of 
price growth may have an impact on fiscal stance. The other determinant is openness of the 
economy, which reflects the hypothesis that more open economies usually have better access 
to capital markets and are hence able to have larger deficits. On the other hand, open 
economies are more dependent on foreign investors and may thus have an incentive to run 
more responsible fiscal policies. We also allow for the possibility that the level of 
development (expressed as GDP per capita, either in absolute terms or relative to some 
average) may also have an effect on the fiscal behaviour. Also, a number of social and 
institutional characteristics may influence the level of surplus through different channels (see 
Drazen 2000 or Persson and Tabellini 2000 for thorough reviews). Finally, in order to 
achieve intertemporal sustainability of fiscal policy, the stock of public debt has to be 
included among the regressors. The expected positive sign of the respective coefficient 
expresses a hypothesis of the long-run stabilising behaviour of the growing stock of debt. All 
the abovementioned characteristics build the column vector of control variables xit. We 
assume that these variables can exert a dynamic impact on fiscal surplus, with a maximum 
lag of M. 
Hence, the equation of structural surplus can then be specified as: 
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(6) ))y~ln((L)g/hln(L)g/hln( M
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where L is the lag operator and  are i. i. d. innovations that represent purely 
discretionary decisions of fiscal authorities, uncorrelated with any other explanatory variable 
(we dropped subscripts it to save space). Solving for structural surplus yields: 
(7) 


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After substituting into (5) and re-arranging, we obtain finally: 
(8) +−++= N1 Sn
n
S0 ))y~ln()g/h(ln(L)y~ln()g/hln(
))y~ln((LM
0
'
mm
m +++ x . 
The above equation is an ADL(N,max{M;N}) model. Differently from model (5), 
which contains an unobservable )g/hlog( itit , this equation contains only observables and 
can be thus directly estimated using the econometric procedures. 
A parameter of special interest in equation (8) is the overall elasticity of surplus to 
contemporaneous output gap, equal 0S  + . It has two components: the elasticity of 
automatic stabilizers S and the elasticity of government’ s reaction function 0. This measure 
allows us to easily define the procyclical and countercyclical fiscal policy. A natural 
benchmark for the parameter 0S  +  is 1, which corresponds to the case when revenues 
change proportionally to output, expenditures are cyclically neutral and the fiscal authorities 
do not undertake any actions in response to the business cycle fluctuations. Its exact level 
depends on such factors as the progressiveness of the tax system, relative share of indirect 
taxes (that typically move proportionally to the tax base), or the share of such cyclically 
sensitive expenditure components as unemployment benefits. The empirical analysis 
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presented further in the paper shows that, indeed, 1.2 is a typical value taken by so defined 
cyclical elasticity of the budget, while standard deviation of the respective estimate only 
occasionally exceeds 0.2. This allows us to define cyclically neutral fiscal policy as the case 
when the cyclical budget elasticity ranges from 1.0 to 1.4. Values of S below this range 
correspond to procyclical policy, when actions undertaken by governments limit the 
operation of fiscal stabilizers. Budget elasticity higher than 1.4 denotes, in turn, the cases 
when the governments run countercyclical fiscal policy, thus strengthening the built-in 
automatic stabilizers. 
II. WHAT DETERMINES FISCAL CYCLICALITY? 
A method to examine the determinants of fiscal cyclicality is to allow the output 
elasticity of fiscal surplus, 0S  + , to vary both between countries and over time. While it is 
unlikely that the governments change the values of S (the strength of the automatic 
stabilizers) on a year-to-year basis, it is possible that they influence it in the longer run. 
International comparisons show, indeed, considerable differences in the size of automatic 
stabilizers between the countries (van den Noord 2002). 
The second component, 0, reflects the government’ s discretionary reactions to the 
state of economy.3 If a government runs a passive policy, that is, keeps the structural surplus 
constant, than 0 = 0. However, it is reasonable to assume that typically this is not the case, 
since most governments, as they proudly announce, take some actions in response to the 
anticipated recessions. Symmetrically, we can also expect that they do respond to booms as 
                                                 
3
 Since these actions may be described by a reaction function, they may be better described as 
quasi-discretionary. 
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well. Contrary to S, that is unlikely to change rapidly, parameter 0 may both differ 
considerably between countries, as well as quickly change on a year-to-year basis. 
Since it is both irrelevant and difficult to distinguish econometrically between 
changes in S and 0, we treat them as a single parameter, no matter from where the output 
elasticity of fiscal surplus comes, whether from automatic stabilisers or a government’ s 
reaction function. The following subsection discusses the list of potential determinants of the 
joint parameter 0S  + . 
II.1. Choice of The Determinants of Fiscal Cyclicality 
Among the available theories of fiscal procyclicality, chronologically the first one is 
the hypothesis of financial restraints. According to this hypothesis, the main factor that limits 
governments’  abilities to react countercyclically is credit rationing imposed by investors 
(Gavin et al. 1996; Calderon et al. 2003; Calderon and Schmidt 2003). The role of financial 
restraints is supposed to be particularly large in the less-developed countries. Due to low 
creditworthiness, investors tend to impose high risk premiums there, or resort to direct credit 
rationing during economic downturns, thus narrowing the room for countercyclical fiscal 
actions. 
This theory, while simple and highly intuitive, has also serious drawbacks, generally 
associated with its lack of consistent theoretical foundations (see discussion in Alesina and 
Tabellini 2005). One may doubt, why investors impose borrowing constraints only during 
recessions, instead of keeping low exposure to a country-specific risks continuously over the 
business cycle. Another issue is why these countries do not accumulate reserves in good 
times so that they were able to use them during economically weaker times. However, both 
doubts seem to have relatively simple answers. The observation that the borrowing 
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constraints become particularly severe during economic downturns, instead of being 
smoothed over the cycle, seems to be consistent with the observation that capital markets 
tend to react too much and too late. The herd behaviour of investors results in massive 
withdrawals of investments when concerns about the solvency of the public sector become 
evident. Numerous theories of the widely observed deficit bias from the field of political 
economy explain why poor countries do not accumulate reserves in good times (see, for 
example, Drazen 2000 for a review). These two mechanisms together can result in the deficit 
bias, which can be, however, squeezed out in times of recession because of the borrowing 
constraints. 
Hence, the theory of financial constraints still offers some theoretical explanatory 
power, while its predictions have widely been tested in the literature. The empirical studies 
use several economic variables as proxies for the stringency of financial constraints. These 
variables are the fiscal balance (Perry 2003; Woo 2006), the stock of public debt (OECD 
2003), trade openness as a measure of access to foreign capital markets (Lane 2003; Woo 
2006), credit ratings and the spread of sovereign debt over the US debt (Alesina and Tabellini 
2005), and the current account balance (Woo 2006). Another measure could be country risk 
premium spreads used by Calderon and Schmidt (2003), while the authors treat high values 
of this variable rather as a sign of weak institutions and the lack of credibility.  
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) suggested that the influence of borrowing constraints on 
the ability to conduct an anti-cyclical policy should differ during downturns and upturns, and 
that the borrowing constraints should only exert their impact during recessions. However, 
this idea has not been tested empirically, probably because of the complexity of the 
econometric procedure that would have to be used in this case. 
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Nevertheless, because of some potential shortcomings of the conventional concept of 
financial constraints, several alternative theories have been developed. Tornell and Lane 
(1998; 1999) built the common-pool models to explain fiscal procyclicality. In their game-
theoretic setup, different power blocs compete for a share in a common pool of fiscal 
revenues. Power blocs can be interpreted as branches of government (legislative versus 
executive), parties within a coalition, or ministries within a government’ s executive branch. 
Their key result is what is known as the voracity effect. Because the competition for the 
common resource becomes more intense during economic upturns, spending can grow more 
than proportionally to the increase in income, resulting in a procyclical outcome. Lane 
(2003), in line with these theoretical predictions, presented empirical evidence that countries 
with more volatile output and more dispersed political power are those most likely to run 
procyclical fiscal policies. 
Similarly, Talvi and Vegh (2000) developed a model in which the key forces that 
drive procyclical policies are the groups of interests that push for state expenditures in their 
areas. While it is easier for governments to counter actions of these groups during the 
economically weaker times, this is less the case during expansion, as governments have no 
excuse for keeping the outlays down then.  
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) offered an explanation for procyclical fiscal policies in 
which the key determinant is the presence of corruption. In their model, it is easier for the 
authorities to steal during prosperous times, as enough resources are available then to provide 
a sufficient supply of public goods to the citizens. According to Alesina and Tabellini’ s 
(2005) central conclusion, fiscal policies are more likely to be procyclical in countries with 
higher corruption and weaker institutions, and they present empirical evidence to support this 
view. 
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Woo (2006) followed a slightly different line of reasoning. He presented a model of 
strategically behaving policymakers under a polarisation of preferences, which becomes the 
key determinant of the degree of procyclicality. He found empirical evidence that income and 
educational inequality, as measures of polarisation, are indeed correlated with the index of 
fiscal procyclicality. 
These theories form another group, clearly distinguishable from the hypothesis of 
financial constraints. In line with theories from this group, these are mainly political and 
empirical characteristics of countries that determine the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. 
Among the variables used in empirical studies are indices of corruption (Alesina and 
Tabellini4 2005), a measure of institutional quality (Woo 2006), measures of political 
constraints (Lane5 2003; Woo 2006), and the Gini coefficient for the distribution of income 
and an index of educational polarisation, both used as measures of social polarisation by 
Woo (2006). 
There is also a number of other variables used as factors that explain differences in 
the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policies, that cannot be clearly attributed to any of the 
abovementioned theories. These are membership in the OECD (Kaminski et al. 2004), initial 
GDP per capita (Alesina and Tabellini 2005; Woo 2006), GDP per capita (Lane 2003), size 
of the public sector (Lane 2003; Woo 2006), and the volatility of output, measured as the 
standard deviation of GDP growth rates (Lane 2003). While some of these variables are used 
explicitly as regressors for the output elasticity of fiscal variables, the others (such as 
                                                 
4
 The source of the index itself was Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004). 
5
 The index itself was devised by Henisz (2000). 
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membership in the OECD) come up as ex post explanations for the observed differences, 
although without clear theoretical reasons. 
It is difficult to eliminate a priori any of the variables usually used to explain 
differences in cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy, since most of them have, however, strong 
theoretical foundations. Hence, we adopted a different empirical strategy, taking initially a 
relatively generous set of potential determinants of the parameter 0S  + , and testing their 
relevance empirically. The initial choice of potential determinants included the variables 
listed below. 
Institutional quality (isreg) 
To our knowledge, there is no readily-available specific theory that relates cyclical 
response of fiscal policy to the quality of institutions. However, the impact of the latter 
variable on fiscal policy in general is a widely accepted presumption. Hence, it is reasonable 
to expect that is may also exert influence on the way the governments react to business cycle. 
Among the available indices that are supposed to measure quality of institutions, the 
Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney and Lawson 2005) is probably the most 
widely used one. Among its five components we have selected the 5th: ”Regulation of Credit, 
Labor, and Business” as the best measure of the quality of institutions per se. The other 
components are either irrelevant (such as access to sound money) or are addressed in our 
study in a different way (such as the size of government), hence including them in the index 
would be likely to blur the results. We expect the quality of institutions to have a positive 
impact on 0S  +  (i.e. better institutions mean more countercyclical policy). 
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Political constraints (iscoh) 
The index of political constraints can be treated as an alternative measure of 
institutions. We used the POLCON index constructed by Henisz (2000, with the later 
updates), who defines it as a function of the number of independent effective veto points in 
the political process. Higher score in POLCON index means lower probability that the 
undertaken policy will change. Since countries that run strongly procyclical fiscal policy 
require to change their fiscal stance frequently, we expect them to be characterized by low 
values of the index of political constraints. 
Corruption (iscor) 
The use of corruption in this study is directly derived from the recent theory of 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005). As a measure of corruption we used the index of corruption 
perception from the ICGG database. In line with this theory, we expect corruption to be 
higher in countries that tend to run procyclical fiscal policy.  
Polarisation of preferences (isgini) 
As suggested by Woo (2006), the polarisation of preferences is likely to be the key 
underlying factor that explains the differences in fiscal policies. Taking this author’ s 
approach, as a proxy for polarisation of preferences we used the Gini coefficient for 
disposable income. The Gini coefficient itself was obtained from the UNU-WIDER (2005) 
World Income Inequality Database. The database is a compilation of results from various 
studies, hence the comparability between countries is limited. Because of low quality of the 
data and relatively few data points when compared to other indicators, the results obtained 
using this indicator should be treated with caution. An open issue is also, whether 
polarisation of income is a valid proxy for a degree of polarisation of preferences. 
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Age of democracy (idem) 
Some studies indicate that the age of democracy is an index that measures in a 
complex manner different aspects of the development. In relation to fiscal policy, Brender 
and Drazen (2005) use it to explain the presence of political business cycle, while Persson 
and Tabellini (2005) employ the age of democracy to explain differences in productivity. We 
use their data to construct an index of the age of democracy, which we defined as a logarithm 
of the number of years between current year and the first year of democracy. As older 
democracies are expected to have stronger institutions, we expect them also to run more 
countercyclical fiscal policy. 
Level of development (yv) 
The existing empirical evidence suggests that procyclical fiscal policies are generally 
a problem of the less-developed economies. As these countries are often characterized by a 
mix of weak economic fundamentals, weak institutions and low GDP per capita, it is 
important to distinguish whether bad policies are due to well-defined problems, such as 
institutions or high deficit, or it is purely a matter of a country being less-developed. To test 
the latter, a measure of GDP per capita was included among the regressors of fiscal 
cyclicality. 
Openness of the economy (xh) 
Openness of the economy, measured as the ratio of sum of exports and imports to 
GDP, may exert a twofold impact on the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. In more open 
economies governments are likely to adhere to standards of running responsible (i.e. 
countercyclical, among others) fiscal policy, as they depend strongly on international 
investors. On the other hand, during a recession the governments in such countries are more 
exposed to abrupt outflows of foreign capital in case investors suspect problems with 
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solvency. The governments may in such cases choose to consolidate, thus reverting to 
procyclical fiscal policy. The two mechanisms work in opposite directions, hence it is 
difficult to form ex ante expectations concerning the overall impact of openness of the 
economy on fiscal cyclicality. 
Structural surplus (sl1) and public debt (br) 
The main idea of the theories of financial constraints is that governments that are 
already in bad financial situation may not be able  to expand deficit during an economic 
downturn, due to a credit rationing imposed by investors. It remains an open issue what 
exactly constitutes a bad financial situation of a government. Potentially, it can be both high 
structural deficit and a large accumulated stock of debt. We decided to use both indicators in 
order to determine whether the liquidity constraints play any role in making the fiscal policy 
procyclical. 
II.2. Methodological Issues 
An empirical approach typically employed in the literature is to use a two-step 
procedure (see, for example, Lane 2003, Fatas and Mihov 2004, Alesina and Tabellini 2005). 
The first step is to estimate country-by-country parameters of the equation: 
(9) 
iiiii y +′+= x , 
where yit is a fiscal variable of interest and xit is a vector of contemporaneous and 
lagged macroeconomic variables. Then, in the second stage, the parameters of the following 
set of equations are estimated: 
(10) ii0i ρ++= z  , 
where zi is a vector of country-specific political and institutional variables and  is a 
matrix of parameters.  
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However, as Canova and Pappa (2005) pointed out, this two-step procedure may give 
misleading results, tending to overestimate the impact of variables zi on the parameters . 
The main problem to which they pointed is that while the ’ s in the second step have been 
estimated, the procedure treats them as if they were observable, which leads to the estimates 
of  being reported as statistically significant, even though the true effect is weak or absent.6 
There is also another drawback to the described methodology. It only allows for time-
invariant regressors in the second stage, since the equation (10) uses only the cross-sectional 
variance, while the time variance is entirely used up in the first stage. While it can be a minor 
problem when zi includes only institutional variables that, by nature, change slowly, it 
becomes more serious when the variables like stock of public debt or the GDP per capita are 
included in the analysis. 
For these reasons, this paper uses an alternative methodology. It assumes that ’ s can 
vary both between cross-sections and in time, which can be described by equation 
ττ += i0i z . This formula is then directly plugged into iiiii y +′+= x , which yields 
finally: 
(11) 
iii0iii y +′+′+= zxx . 
This equation, that now contains a number of interaction variables 
ii zx′ , can be 
estimated using standard panel econometric techniques. The vector  in the case that is 
analyzed in this paper consists of only one variable, ( )
τ
ε+κ iS0 . 
To our knowledge, there are two studies that use interaction terms to allow for 
varying parameters of fiscal response to the business cycle. The first are Calderon and 
                                                 
6
 See also Canova (2007) for a textbook exposition of this problem. 
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Schmidt (2003), who showed that fiscal policy tends to become procyclical in those Latin-
American countries that are characterized by high country risk premium spreads. They found 
out that “countries with low to moderate risk spreads – reflecting better fundamentals and 
larger credibility – are capable of pursuing counter-cyclical policies” (p. 898). Their results 
said, however, little about which factor – fundamentals or credibility is the key determinant 
of fiscal cyclicality. Another study is of Persson and Tabellini (2005), who used interaction 
terms of output gap and the dummy variables to show that fiscal reactions to the business 
cycle tend to be more countercyclical under majoritarian political systems.  
However, both analyses use the conventional measures of fiscal surplus (i.e. its ratio 
to GDP). Hence, since the samples comprised countries with varying size of the public 
sectors, the validity of both findings is problematic (see point I.2 for a detailed discussion of 
the issue). 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
III.1. Data and the Estimation Techniques 
The empirical analysis uses economic data from the European Commission’ s Ameco 
database. Social and institutional indicators come from the other sources described in 
Appendix A. The data are organised as an unbalanced panel of 28 countries over the years 
1980-2005 (the list of countries is presented in tables in Appendix B). 
Since all the estimated equations are dynamic, the standard fixed-effects panel 
estimator is typically biased and inconsistent (Nickell 1981). To avoid this problem, this 
study used as its main econometric method the Arellano and Bond (1991) generalised 
method of moments (GMM) procedure. To make it less computationally intensive, we 
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limited the number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments to 15.7 The second 
method was the bias-corrected fixed-effects estimator (FE-BC), originally proposed by 
Kiviet (1995). Judson and Owen (1996; 1999) suggested it to be the best estimator for use in 
macroeconomic panels where the number of individuals is typically moderate and similar to 
the number of time periods. However, because of problems with including more than one lag 
of the dependent variable among the regressors, we decided to use it as complementary to the 
Arellano-Bond GMM.8 We used the latter as the primary estimator in the process of 
specification testing. 
III.2. Estimation of The Baseline Model 
The preliminary step of the analysis was the testing of the specifications of equation 
(8). We set the maximum lag for all regressors to two years (i.e. M = N = 2) and let the 
specification tests determine the dynamic structure of the model. We determined the choice 
of a two-year lag by the nature of the budgetary process. Governments usually draft their 
budgets for year t in the second half of year t – 1, when the fiscal and macroeconomic data 
for year t – 2 are known. Introducing more lags would also have been unlikely to add much 
more information, as the model already has a memory because of the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable on the right-hand side. Given a relatively large number of regressors (10 
and a constant), including too many lags would also considerably increase the problem of 
multicollinearity. 
                                                 
7
 For the calculations we used XTABOND routine in STATA. The programs and dataset are 
available from author upon request. 
8
 We used the STATA implementation of a bias-corrected fixed-effects estimator XTLSDVC, 
programmed by Bruno (2005). 
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Equation (8) defines an ADL(2,2) model, with the primary surplus as the dependent 
variable and a list of exogenous regressors that include output gap, debt, inflation, the 
openness of the economy, and the relative level of GDP per capita. It seems reasonable to 
expect that the determinants of fiscal cyclicality described in point II.1 also influence the 
level of surplus. Hence, all these variables were also included on the right-hand side with 
lags of up to two years. An exception is the age of democracy, which is a variable that 
smoothly increases each year by the same percentage (see Appendix A for a description). 
Since adding lags of this variable introduces no additional information to the model, we 
included only its contemporaneous value. The stock of public debt was included only in the 
first and second lags, since the contemporaneous value of debt is directly linked with fiscal 
surplus through a stock-flow identity. 
Table 3 presents the results of the general-to-specific testing of the preliminary ADL 
model. Specification [1] does not include a Gini coefficient (isgini) due to poor data 
availability for this variable compared to the other indicators. Using it in the initial 
specification would result in large changes in the number of observations, depending on 
whether it is excluded further, which would render the specification testing unreliable. 
Specifications with this variable included are therefore presented separately in column [6]. 
Column [1] of Table 3 makes it clear that some of the variables do not seem to play 
any role in determining the level of the fiscal surplus. These are openness (xh), the level of 
development (yv), and institutional quality (isreg). This, however, may be a result of a lack of 
significance or only of a multicollinearity between different lags of the same variable. We 
therefore decided to remove the first and second lags of such variables, thus allowing for 
dynamic impact only through the presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand 
side of the model. This led to the specification presented in column [2]. Testing for joint 
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restrictions showed that restrictions imposed at this stage were valid, with the p-value of the 
Wald test equal to 27%. 
Specification [2] still contained some lags of variables that appeared to be statistically 
insignificant. At the next stage we decided to specify the lag structure, removing lags that 
turned out to be statistically insignificant in [2], while not yet removing any variable entirely 
from the model. We selected the candidates based on the results of the t-tests. We removed 
the contemporaneous inflation rate (pi), the first lags of output gap (yo) and the index of 
political constraints (iscoh), and the second lags of public debt (br), inflation, and the index 
of corruption (iscor). The newly imposed restrictions resulted in equation [3]. The Wald test 
showed that the restrictions imposed jointly since the full ADL(2,2) model are valid, with a 
p-value equal to 56%. 
A more radical type of restriction is removing the regressors that do not appear to 
have any significant impact on the dependent variable. Judging by the t-statistics, the 
potential candidates for exclusion are the level of development (yv) and the age of democracy 
(idem). Low values of t-statistics also suggested another major change in the dynamics of the 
model, which was removing the second lag of the dependent variable from among the 
regressors. A number of Wald tests for joint restrictions (not reported here) suggested that 
while the impact of the two earlier variables is insignificant at any conventional level, with 
the p-value for the joint restrictions equal to 56%, removing the second lag of the dependent 
variable causes a considerable decrease of the p-value, to 17%. 
Removing the two mentioned variables resulted in specification [4] in Table 3. Still, 
relatively low values of t-statistics suggested removing the second lag of the dependent 
variable from among the regressors, as well as the index of political constraints (iscoh). 
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Imposing these two restrictions resulted, however, in a rapid increase of the statistics of the 
Wald test and a p-value as low as 3.7%.  
An examination of the latter specification showed that the orders of magnitude of all 
coefficients are reasonable and the signs are in line with expectations. The only exception is 
the coefficient of the corruption indicator, according to which countries with higher 
corruption have larger surpluses. However, it should be noted that the same variable lagged 
by one year has almost the same coefficient, but with the opposite sign. This suggests that the 
two impacts may offset each other so that the total impact would be zero. However, a series 
of Wald tests (not reported here) showed that removing either of these variables results in a 
considerable drop of the p-values. Therefore, as the model was to be used for further 
extensions and testing, we decided to use a more generous specification and retain both 
variables in the model. 
In all the specifications, the Arellano and Bond (1991) m2 and m3 statistics indicated 
no autocorrelation of the error term at conventional levels of significance. Also, the J-
statistics of the Sargan’ s test for overidentifying restrictions suggested that the instruments 
used are valid in all cases. The same refers to all the estimation results presented further. 
Column [5] presents the results of the estimate performed using the bias-corrected 
fixed-effect estimator. In almost all cases they have the same orders of magnitude and the 
same sign as their GMM counterparts. Column [6] presents an extension of [4] by including 
the Gini coefficient that is supposed to measure the polarisation of preferences. The empirical 
evidence does not support the hypothesis that it is an important determinant of fiscal surplus, 
although this may be a result of relatively poor-quality data, as well as of considerably 
smaller number of observations than in the other cases. 
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The presented analysis allowed us to formulate the baseline specification that 
captures the crucial determinants of fiscal primary surplus. We use this model later in the 
paper to analyse the determinants of cyclical behaviour on fiscal surplus through the 
inclusion of the relevant interaction terms. 
III.3. Empirical Results 
The method we used to examine the determinants of the cyclical behaviour of fiscal 
surpluses was to replace the parameter 0S  +  (in equation (8)) with a product of a vector of 
determinants of fiscal cyclicality and a vector of coefficients, together with a constant. This 
led to extending equation (8) by adding the transposition of the vector of interaction variables 
)~log(yz , multiplied by the corresponding vector of parameters  on the right-hand side. The 
elements of vector z are the potential determinants of fiscal cyclicality, described above.  
Prior analysis showed that the lagged rather then contemporaneous values of public 
debt (br) and the index of political constraints (iscoh) played a role in determining the level 
of fiscal surpluses. In these cases we decided to use these lags instead of contemporaneous 
values to construct the interaction terms. 
Table 4 presents the results of the analysis of the specifications for the model with the 
interaction terms.9 Staring from the most generous specification (column [1]), we removed 
the insignificant variables on a one-by-one basis, each time taking the variable with the 
lowest t-statistics. We checked the validity of the resulting sets of restrictions at each stage 
using the Wald test against the model with a full set of interaction variables. At the last stage 
                                                 
9
 To economise on space, we removed columns [3] and [4] from the presented table. Full 
results are available from the author upon request. 
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two variables with a significant impact on the cyclicality of fiscal policy remained (column 
[8]). These were the index of regulations (isreg) and the size of public debt (lagged by one 
year, br). The p-values of the Wald test for imposing zero restrictions on all other potential 
determinants is 28%, hence their impact seems not to be significant at conventional levels. 
Imposing zero restrictions on the impact of isreg causes the p-value to fall to 1.1%, while in 
case of br it falls below 1%. In regressions [1] through [8], both coefficients of interest show 
considerable stability, although the coefficient of isreg decreases somewhat after having 
removed iscor from the specification. Since isreg is a standardised variable, the results show 
that countries with this indicator higher by 10% of the sample standard deviation tend to run 
more countercyclical fiscal policies, characterised by an overall output elasticity of surplus 
higher by .04 ÷ .06. On the other hand, a ratio of public debt to GDP higher by 10 percentage 
points results, on average, in the output elasticity of surplus being reduced by .06 ÷ .07. The 
results obtained from the bias-corrected fixed-effects estimator (column [9] in Table 4) 
generally confirm the ones obtained from the Arellano-Bond GMM method, although the 
coefficients are somewhat lower (.03 and .05, respectively). 
Similar to our attempts to estimate the parameters of the baseline specification, poor 
data availability did not allow us to examine the impact of the Gini coefficient (isgini) during 
the main estimation process. We therefore added this variable in the last stage of analysis 
(column [10] in Table 4). The t-statistics do not exceed .7, so the data do not seem to support 
the hypothesis about the significance of the impact of income polarisation on the cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policies in the analysed countries. 
The results we obtained suggest that two main factors behind the procyclical fiscal 
policies in the sample are low values of the index of regulations isreg and a high level of 
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public debt (high br). This gives support to two hypotheses concerning the factors behind 
fiscal procyclicality.  
The first of these hypotheses is that governments resort to procyclical fiscal policies 
under the pressure of liquidity constraints when they have accumulated large public debt. It is 
interesting to note that, according to our results, it is a high stock of public debt, not a high 
deficit, that is the main factor that makes investors impose financial constraints on 
governments. It should be noted that the last explanatory variable removed from the 
specification, at the margin of being statistically significant, was trade openness. This seems 
to give additional support to the hypothesis of financial constraints by suggesting that fiscal 
policies may be more procyclical in more open economies. Governments in such economies 
are typically exposed to rapid flows of capital in situations involving emerging doubts 
concerning fiscal sustainability. They may then be willing to react more aggressively and to 
consolidate public finances in the face of such runs, even if this means running a procyclical 
fiscal policy. 
The other significant determinant of fiscal cyclicality is the index that measures the 
quality of regulations, isreg. The results suggest that countries with better institutions tend to 
run more countercyclical fiscal policies. At the same time, our results suggest that they also 
have larger fiscal surpluses in general (according to [8] in Table 4, a country with values of 
this index higher by one sample standard deviation runs a primary surplus higher by 4.3% of 
total expenditures). It is interesting to note that these two channels work independently. That 
is, better institutions cause more countercyclical fiscal policy directly, not because they result 
in higher surpluses and hence loosen liquidity constraints.  
In addition to the above results, Table 5 presents the results of a number of 
regressions we ran to check the robustness of the observed relationships. One potential 
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weakness could be the choice of the dependent variable. The main variable typically used in 
other studies to describe fiscal stance is the total fiscal surplus, which is equal to the primary 
surplus minus interest payments on pubic debt. Columns [1] and [2] in Table 5 present the 
final regressions with the total surplus rather than the primary surplus used as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient measuring the impact of the quality of regulations (isreg) is almost 
the same as in previous cases, while the coefficient that measures impact of the stock of debt 
(br) is considerably higher, independent on the estimation method. This is likely to reflect the 
fact that total interest payments react more strongly to the cyclical fluctuations of interest 
rates in countries with more public debt than in less-indebted ones. 
Columns [3] through [5] present the results of estimations for sub-periods 1980-1988, 
1989-1997 and 1998-2005, respectively. Because many of the countries joined the sample in 
the second or even in the third period, the three estimations differ not only by time period, 
but also by the number of countries included in the sample. All three of these sub-panels are 
also noticeably more balanced than the full sample. The measured impact of the quality of 
regulations (isreg) on fiscal cyclicality is statistically significant in all three sub-samples 
(coefficients between .8 and 1.4), and much stronger than in the full sample (coefficient 
equal to .4). A possible interpretation links this regularity with the sub-panels’  shorter time 
span. If the relationship between the explanatory variable and the cyclical behaviour of 
surplus were considerably stronger between countries than across time it could produce the 
observed result. This hypothesis cannot be checked directly through using even shorter 
panels, however, since the applied method requires a certain time span for the sample 
(possibly covering a full business cycle) to measure the cyclical sensitivity of public 
finances. 
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The results concerning the impact of the second variable, the stock of public debt 
(br), do not seem to be as robust as in the earlier case. The impact is strong only in the 
middle period (1989-1997), and, similarly to the case of isreg, stronger than in the full 
sample. In the last period the impact is statistically insignificant, while still with the expected 
sign and an order of magnitude similar to the estimates obtained from the full sample. In the 
first period the impact is also statistically indistinguishable from zero, but with a different 
sign than expected. These results show that the impact of liquidity constraints, represented by 
the stock of public debt, is not as robust as is the case with the institutional variable isreg. 
Another way of checking the robustness of results is by performing the estimations 
for sub-groups of countries. Columns [6] through [8] present estimation results for three 
groups. These are the high-income countries,10 the EU-15, and the new EU member countries 
(EU-10).11 In the two earlier groups the coefficients that measure the impact of isreg and br 
on the cyclical sensitivity of public finances are both statistically significant and of the same 
order of magnitude as in the full sample. In the last sub-sample, theEU-10, the results are 
considerably different in terms of the order of magnitude, while the signs remain as expected. 
Also, only the impact of isreg remains significantly different from zero. The differences 
between this and the earlier cases may be a consequence of both a much smaller sample (30 
observations, compared with more than 200 in the earlier cases), as well as the effects of 
transition, since the majority in this sub-sample are the post-communist countries. The fact 
                                                 
10
 This group consists of the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Switzerland, Norway, 
and the EU-15 except for Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 
11
 Countries that joined the European Union on the May 1, 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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that coefficients of interest have the same sign suggests that the observed relationships exist 
not only between developed and less-developed countries, but also within each group. At the 
same time, the strength of this relationship differs considerably between sub-samples. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This study presented an analysis of the determinants of cyclical behaviour of fiscal 
surpluses within the business cycle. It sought to answer the question of why some 
governments revert to procyclical fiscal policies although the standard normative prescription 
is to run fiscal policy in a countercyclical manner, relying mainly on automatic stabilisers. 
In order to avoid the pitfalls of the two-step methods typically used in previous 
studies, this study used a one-step method with interaction variables that allowed it to exploit 
both the time and cross-section variances of the sample. It also overcame the problems with 
statistical inference linked with the standard two-step procedure.  
The study compared the explanatory power of two prominent groups of theories. 
According to the first of them, the main reason for pro-cyclical fiscal policies is the financial 
constraints that governments face. According to the other group of theories, the main reasons 
for fiscal procyclicality are such political and institutional factors as the societies’  institutions 
and preferences. The empirical evidence gives some support to both groups of theories, 
although this support is not equally strong. 
The empirical results show that the quality of regulations, a component of the widely 
used Gwartney and Lawson (2005) Economic Freedom of the World index, plays a crucial 
role in determining the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policies. Higher values of this index, 
interpreted as better institutions, considerably increase the output elasticity of primary fiscal 
surpluses. The analysis based on the whole 26-year panel shows that values of the index 
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higher by one sample standard deviation increase the elasticity by .4 to .5 (in a typical 
cyclically-neutral case this elasticity would be close to unity). In the shorter sub-panels this 
impact is even stronger, which may suggest that the relationship is stronger across countries 
than across time. These results are robust when selecting only sub-groups of countries, while 
for the new EU member states the impact of the quality of regulations is much stronger. 
We also found some evidence in support of the role of financial constraints in 
determining the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. According to our results, an increase of 
public debt by 10% of GDP decreases the overall output elasticity of fiscal surplus by .06. 
This result is, however, not stable across time, as it has the expected sign in only two out of 
the three sub-periods, and is statistically significant in only one of them (1989-1997). Also, 
this impact, while with the correct sign, is not statistically significant in the sub-panel 
representing the less-developed countries. This last result is surprising, as it contradicts the 
conventional view that resorting to procyclical fiscal policy in response to financial 
constraints is mainly a problem of less-developed economies. 
Our results do not confirm the role of large deficits as the key causal factor of 
procyclical fiscal policies. The results also give support to neither of the two recent well-
specified theories of fiscal procyclicality provided by Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Woo 
(2005). We found no link between corruption, as proposed in the first case, nor social 
polarisation, as proposed in the second. The latter result may be due to limited availability of 
data on income polarisation and its relatively poor quality in terms of comparability between 
countries. There was no statistical evidence for the significant impact of other measures of 
institutions (besides quality of regulations), such as index of political constraints and the age 
of democracy. We also found no significant role for the differences in the stage of 
development, measured as the differences in GDP per capita. 
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Our results therefore show that it is the quality of institutions that makes governments 
follow the prescriptions to increase fiscal deficits during recessions and repay the debt during 
economic booms. To some extent their countercyclical actions may be restrained by the high 
accumulated level of public debt. It would be worthwhile to analyse whether these 
regularities also hold for the broader samples of countries, although the limited access to 
high-quality data covering the general government sectors is an important problem here. 
Another issue would be to examine precisely what components of fiscal aggregates are 
responsible for procyclical behaviour. These questions are clearly venues for further research 
in the area of modelling the cyclical behaviour of fiscal authorities. 
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APPENDIX A. DATA DEFINITIONS 
Economic variables 
The economic data come the Ameco database provided by the European Commission. 
We used version that was made available in April 2006. Fiscal variables refer to general 
government and were computed according to ESA’ 95 accounting standards 
Var. Name Calculation 
sw Primary surplus Natural logarithm of ratio of revenue to expenditure (excluding 
interest payments), both expressed as per cent of GDP 
sl Total surplus Natural logarithm of ratio of revenue to expenditure, both 
expressed as per cent of GDP 
yo Output gap Natural logarithm of ratio of actual to potential GDP, both 
expressed at 2000 market prices. Potential GDP was calculated 
from real GDP using Hodrick-Prescott filter.12 
br Debt General government consolidated gross debt, expressed as per 
cent of GDP 
pi Inflation Natural logarithm of ratio of present and lagged values of GDP 
price deflator at market prices 
xh Trade openness Sum of exports and imports of goods and services at current 
prices, divided by GDP at current prices. In order to remove any 
possible cyclical effects the series was smoothed using Hodrick-
Prescott filter. 
yv Stage of 
development 
GDP per capita expressed in Euro, as a ratio to sample average. 
In order to remove any possible cyclical effects the series was 
smoothed using Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
                                                 
12
 H-P filter was applied using HPRESCOTT routine in STATA. 
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Quality of regulations (isreg) 
The index of regulatory quality is the “Regulation” component of Gwartney and 
Lawson’ s (2005) Economic Freedom of the World (available at www.freetheworld.com). 
Since until 2000 data are available only with 5-year frequency, the missing data points were 
interpolated. Index of regulatory quality isreg, as well as the other measures related to 
institutional features (iscoh, idem, isgini) were normalised to have mean 0 and standard 
deviation equal to 1. 
Corruption (iscor) 
Data on Corruption Perception Index come from the database of Internet Center for 
Corruption Research (available at www.icgg.org). As for two earlier periods data are 
available only as averages for 1980-1985 and 1988-1992, the data were treated as exact for 
two mid-years, i. e. 1983 and 1990, respectively. Then, the data for missing years in between 
were interpolated. 
Political constraints (iscoh) 
The index of political constraints on the executive come from the database of Witold 
Henisz. It is called the POLCON index (version Polcon V) and is available at www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/. 
Gini coefficient (isgini) 
Data were obtained from UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database. The 
database itself is a compilation from numerous sources, which makes extraction of 
comparable data problematic. To provide balance between coverage and comparability, four 
sources of data on disposable income (database name: Income, Disposable) were selected: 
Transmonee 2004, Luxembourg Income Study, European Commission and Brandolini 1998, 
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1999 and 2004 (for references see UNU-WIDER 2005). As a rule, the data points covering 
only a single year in row coming from the same study were excluded from the dataset. 
Age of democracy (idem) 
The age of democracy was computed as a difference between the current year and the 
first year of democracy, as defined by Persson and Tabellini (2005). In the case of three 
countries that are not covered by their data, Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovakia, as the first 
year of democracy was used the year of first free elections (1990 in all three cases). In the 
fourth year, Korea, it was 1948, the last year of the U. S. military government. 
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APPENDIX B. BASIC SAMPLE STATISTICS 
Table 1 Number of available observations in the sample 
Country sw sl yo br pi xh yv isreg iscor iscoh isgini idem 
Australia 33 33 46 0 45 46 46 34 23 45 0 46 
Austria 30 30 46 36 45 46 46 34 23 45 7 46 
Belgium 36 36 46 37 45 46 23 34 23 45 7 46 
Bulgaria 4 4 15 4 14 15 16 18 8 45 11 16 
Canada 21 21 46 0 45 46 46 34 23 45 0 46 
Croatia 4 4 11 5 10 12 6 13 7 14 0 16 
Cyprus 8 8 16 8 15 46 11 33 3 45 0 46 
Czech Republic 14 14 16 10 15 16 11 18 23 12 14 16 
Denmark 35 35 46 35 45 46 46 34 23 45 14 46 
Estonia 13 13 13 10 12 13 13 18 8 12 8 15 
Finland 31 31 46 36 45 46 46 34 23 45 9 46 
France 28 28 46 29 45 46 46 34 23 45 8 46 
Germany 36 36 46 36 0 46 46 34 23 45 13 46 
Greece 18 18 46 36 45 46 46 34 23 44 7 31 
Hungary 7 7 15 10 14 28 14 28 23 45 11 16 
Iceland 15 15 46 0 45 46 43 33 8 45 0 46 
Ireland 21 21 46 36 45 46 46 34 23 45 7 46 
Italy 26 26 46 36 45 46 46 34 23 45 23 46 
Japan 26 26 46 36 45 46 46 34 23 45 0 46 
Korea 8 8 36 0 35 36 36 33 23 45 0 46 
Latvia 15 16 16 10 15 16 14 13 8 14 4 15 
Lithuania 11 11 16 10 15 16 14 18 7 14 9 15 
Luxembourg 16 16 46 36 45 46 46 34 9 45 7 46 
Malta 8 8 15 10 14 46 16 28 2 0 0 42 
Mexico 9 9 46 0 30 46 11 33 23 45 6 12 
Netherlands 37 37 46 31 45 46 46 34 23 45 7 46 
New Zealand 12 12 46 0 45 46 45 34 23 45 0 46 
Norway 16 16 46 9 45 46 46 34 23 45 10 46 
Poland 11 11 16 10 15 26 14 28 23 45 14 17 
Portugal 29 29 46 33 45 46 46 34 23 44 7 30 
Romania 8 8 16 9 15 26 16 34 9 45 14 16 
Slovakia 13 13 14 10 13 16 12 13 8 12 7 16 
Slovenia 6 6 16 10 15 16 11 13 7 14 10 16 
Spain 11 11 46 36 45 46 46 34 23 43 8 28 
Sweden 13 13 46 36 45 46 46 34 23 45 17 46 
Switzerland 13 13 46 0 45 46 46 34 23 45 0 46 
Turkey 4 4 46 9 20 20 36 33 23 45 0 23 
United Kingdom 33 33 46 36 45 46 46 34 23 45 9 46 
United States 46 46 46 37 45 46 46 34 23 45 20 46 
Total 725 726 1381 732 1257 1452 1282 1155 705 1483 288 1352 
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Table 2 Means of variables in the sample 
Country sw sl yo br pi xh yv isreg iscor iscoh isgini idem 
Australia -0.03 -0.13 0.0 n/a 0.05 0.33 1.2 0.79 0.84 0.81 n/a 4.4 
Austria 0.01 -0.05 0.0 0.5 0.04 0.67 1.1 0.08 0.39 0.37 -0.86 3.6 
Belgium 0.04 -0.11 0.0 1.0 0.04 1.20 1.3 0.11 0.18 0.88 -0.17 4.9 
Bulgaria 0.08 0.03 0.0 0.4 0.39 1.10 0.1 -1.20 -1.40 -1.40 0.74 1.9 
Canada 0.09 -0.10 0.0 n/a 0.04 0.55 1.3 1.00 1.00 0.79 n/a 4.8 
Croatia -0.05 -0.10 0.0 0.4 0.04 0.97 0.3 -0.96 -1.50 -0.42 n/a 1.9 
Cyprus -0.01 -0.10 0.0 0.7 0.03 0.99 0.8 -0.21 -0.46 -0.88 n/a 2.9 
Czech Republic -0.10 -0.13 0.0 0.2 0.09 1.10 0.4 -0.90 -0.87 0.41 -1.20 1.9 
Denmark 0.09 0.00 0.0 0.5 0.06 0.69 1.5 0.53 1.10 0.49 -0.12 4.2 
Estonia 0.04 0.03 0.0 0.1 0.11 1.60 0.2 -0.64 -0.44 0.23 1.10 1.9 
Finland 0.09 0.05 0.0 0.3 0.06 0.55 1.2 0.48 1.10 0.50 -0.94 4.2 
France 0.00 -0.06 0.0 0.4 0.05 0.40 1.2 0.25 0.27 -0.07 -0.17 3.6 
Germany 0.01 -0.05 0.0 0.4 n/a 0.51 1.3 -0.06 0.63 0.74 -0.60 3.5 
Greece 0.01 -0.19 0.0 0.7 0.10 0.41 0.5 -0.61 -0.94 -0.94 0.62 2.5 
Hungary -0.02 -0.12 0.0 0.6 0.12 0.94 0.3 -0.67 -1.10 -1.30 -0.83 1.9 
Iceland 0.06 -0.03 0.0 n/a 0.16 0.76 1.4 0.20 1.30 0.47 n/a 3.6 
Ireland 0.09 -0.04 0.0 0.7 0.07 1.10 0.8 0.65 0.54 0.42 0.20 4.1 
Italy 0.01 -0.17 0.0 0.8 0.07 0.39 0.9 -0.37 -1.00 0.41 0.87 3.5 
Japan 0.00 -0.10 0.0 0.8 0.03 0.21 1.2 0.63 0.18 0.42 n/a 4.7 
Korea 0.17 0.15 0.0 n/a 0.10 0.64 0.4 -0.53 -1.20 -0.62 n/a 3.5 
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.1 0.32 0.97 0.2 -0.80 -1.50 0.46 0.40 1.9 
Lithuania -0.05 -0.08 0.0 0.2 0.42 1.10 0.2 -1.30 -1.00 0.44 0.62 1.9 
Luxembourg 0.06 0.05 0.0 0.1 0.04 1.90 1.6 0.98 0.92 0.47 -0.50 4.6 
Malta -0.08 -0.17 0.0 0.6 0.03 1.50 0.5 -0.24 -0.01 n/a n/a 2.8 
Mexico 0.23 0.04 0.0 n/a 0.24 0.31 0.3 -0.50 -1.90 -1.50 3.40 1.7 
Netherlands 0.04 -0.05 0.0 0.6 0.04 1.10 1.2 0.29 0.99 0.42 -0.57 4.2 
New Zealand 0.12 -0.03 0.0 n/a 0.06 0.54 0.9 0.83 1.20 0.37 n/a 4.8 
Norway 0.17 0.12 0.0 0.4 0.05 0.73 1.6 0.24 0.95 0.46 -1.00 4.4 
Poland 0.00 -0.08 0.0 0.4 0.15 0.49 0.2 -1.30 -1.00 -1.30 0.20 2.0 
Portugal -0.02 -0.15 0.0 0.5 0.09 0.56 0.4 -0.33 -0.40 -0.50 1.00 2.5 
Romania 0.00 -0.07 0.0 0.2 0.53 0.36 0.1 -1.80 -1.80 -1.40 -0.27 1.9 
Slovakia -0.09 -0.15 0.0 0.4 0.07 1.30 0.3 -0.74 -1.40 0.49 -0.69 1.9 
Slovenia -0.02 -0.06 0.0 0.3 0.21 1.20 0.6 -0.68 -0.43 0.51 -0.77 1.9 
Spain 0.05 -0.04 0.0 0.4 0.08 0.36 0.6 0.12 -0.38 -0.59 0.38 2.4 
Sweden 0.06 -0.02 0.0 0.5 0.05 0.60 1.5 0.19 1.00 0.45 -1.30 4.2 
Switzerland 0.03 -0.03 0.0 n/a 0.03 0.67 1.7 0.46 0.97 0.88 n/a 4.9 
Turkey 0.26 -0.23 0.0 0.7 0.40 0.41 0.2 -0.53 -1.40 -0.59 n/a 2.2 
United Kingdom 0.01 -0.08 0.0 0.5 0.06 0.50 1.0 0.99 0.78 0.37 0.27 5.0 
United States 0.03 -0.08 0.0 0.6 0.04 0.18 1.7 1.20 0.51 0.78 1.20 5.2 
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APPENDIX C. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table 3 Estimation results – baseline specification.  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Method GMM GMM GMM GMM FE-BC GMM 
Dep. var. sw sw sw sw sw sw 
sw(t-1) 0.604*** 0.652*** 0.727*** 0.726*** 0.839*** 0.484*** 
 [7.34] [7.76] [9.62] [10.1] [14.5] [3.47] 
sw(t-2) 0.136* 0.136 0.0311 0.0466  0.00462 
 [1.74] [1.47] [0.40] [0.58]  [0.063] 
yo 1.139*** 1.094*** 1.211*** 1.198*** 1.239*** 1.251*** 
 [6.79] [5.77] [6.85] [7.44] [8.07] [4.67] 
yo(t-1) -0.469* -0.451 -0.747*** -0.692*** -1.105*** -0.397* 
 [-1.77] [-1.60] [-4.33] [-4.43] [-6.22] [-1.67] 
yo(t-2) -0.236 -0.305     
 [-1.01] [-1.21]     
br(t-1) 0.13 0.0904 0.0695 0.0967*** 0.00829 0.167*** 
 [0.99] [0.67] [1.51] [3.20] [0.24] [2.79] 
br(t-2) -0.0129 -0.00208     
 [-0.11] [-0.016]     
pi 0.0951 0.0902     
 [0.42] [0.39]     
pi(t-1) 0.275** 0.295** 0.186* 0.136 0.215* 0.0996 
 [2.15] [2.09] [1.95] [1.57] [1.72] [0.50] 
pi(t-2) -0.0727 -0.146     
 [-0.35] [-0.72]     
xh 1.404 0.0745 0.0655 0.0998* -0.0565 0.0897 
 [1.03] [1.55] [1.29] [1.91] [-0.84] [0.93] 
xh(t-1) -2.275      
 [-0.77]      
xh(t-2) 0.997      
 [0.59]      
yv 0.342 -0.00783 -0.0245    
 [0.60] [-0.20] [-0.59]    
yv(t-1) -0.375      
 [-0.34]      
yv(t-2) 0.0122      
 [0.021]      
isreg 0.00102 0.0406*** 0.0419*** 0.0410*** 0.0116 0.0460*** 
 [0.066] [2.85] [2.89] [2.79] [0.79] [2.94] 
isreg(t-1) 0.0194      
 [1.11]      
isreg(t-2) 0.0187      
 [1.22]      
iscor 0.0497** 0.0463** 0.0389* 0.0415* 0.0418* 0.0348** 
 [2.35] [2.06] [1.80] [1.74] [1.80] [2.09] 
iscor(t-1) -0.0468*** -0.0472** -0.0438** -0.0364** -0.0405* -0.00913 
 [-2.84] [-2.53] [-2.11] [-2.00] [-1.86] [-0.61] 
iscor(t-2) 0.00023 0.00453     
 [0.020] [0.49]     
Note: t-statistics in brackets. 
Asterisks indicate significance at levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Estimation results – baseline specification (continued). 
iscoh 0.0139 0.0183 0.0132 0.0078 0.0198 0.0137 
 [1.22] [1.64] [1.19] [0.57] [0.99] [1.62] 
iscoh(t-1) 0.00504 0.00555     
 [0.44] [0.50]     
iscoh(t-2) 0.0213 0.0184 0.0209* 0.015 0.027 0.0259*** 
 [1.63] [1.47] [1.82] [1.28] [1.38] [2.66] 
idem 0.0578 0.0496 0.0393    
 [1.02] [0.82] [1.10]    
isgini      0.0123 
      [0.70] 
isgini(t-1)      0.0201 
      [1.43] 
Constant -0.00443** -0.00459*** -0.00374** -0.00427**  -0.0032 
 [-2.57] [-3.09] [-2.47] [-2.53]  [-1.30] 
No of obs. 276 276 295 295 331 104 
No of countries 26 26 26 26 29 22 
Avg no of years 10.62 10.62 11.35 11.35 11.41 4.727 
J-statistics 255.4 244.7 250.4 246.3 x 87.24 
Sargan’ s p-val. 0.700 0.843 0.919 0.944 x 1.000 
m1 -3.63 -3.521 -3.541 -3.559 x -2.613 
m2 1.161 1.252 1.468 1.408 x 1.535 
m3 -0.212 -0.51 -0.96 -0.836 x -0.995 
 45 
Table 4 Estimation results – the main specification with interaction terms 
 [1] [2] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Method GMM FE-BC GMM GMM GMM GMM FE-BC GMM 
Dep. var. sw sw sw sw sw sw sw sw 
sw(t-1) 0.700*** 0.804*** 0.701*** 0.707*** 0.709*** 0.713*** 0.823*** 0.428*** 
 [9.43] [13.9] [9.31] [9.85] [9.81] [9.91] [14.8] [3.09] 
sw(t-2) 0.0499  0.051 0.046 0.0393 0.0424  0.000187 
 [0.64]  [0.65] [0.59] [0.51] [0.55]  [0.0023] 
yo 1.422*** 0.817 1.296*** 1.531*** 1.483*** 1.354*** 1.345*** 1.054* 
 [3.45] [0.76] [5.78] [7.98] [8.72] [8.09] [3.91] [1.90] 
yo(t-1) -0.762*** -0.987*** -0.748*** -0.756*** -0.744*** -0.748*** -1.014*** -0.539** 
 [-4.30] [-5.64] [-4.23] [-4.33] [-4.26] [-4.28] [-5.73] [-1.99] 
br(t-1) 0.0657 0.00436 0.0671 0.0667 0.0668 0.0665 -0.00152 0.233** 
 [1.47] [0.13] [1.48] [1.49] [1.50] [1.48] [-0.044] [2.38] 
pi(t-1) 0.177 0.223 0.176 0.183* 0.152 0.141 0.21 -0.144 
 [1.48] [1.25] [1.63] [1.72] [1.43] [1.33] [1.19] [-0.78] 
xh 0.0548 -0.0143 0.0546 0.0548 0.0566 0.0515 -0.0247 0.157 
 [1.03] [-0.20] [1.01] [1.03] [1.05] [0.97] [-0.34] [1.13] 
isreg 0.0413*** 0.0291* 0.0433*** 0.0433*** 0.0432*** 0.0429*** 0.0284* 0.0319** 
 [2.67] [1.80] [2.73] [2.76] [2.75] [2.77] [1.85] [2.11] 
iscor 0.0385* 0.0322 0.0390* 0.0391* 0.0396* 0.0409* 0.0371 0.0394** 
 [1.87] [1.39] [1.82] [1.83] [1.84] [1.92] [1.61] [2.51] 
iscor(t-1) -0.0446** -0.0424* -0.0449** -0.0457** -0.0451** -0.0452** -0.0450** -0.00664 
 [-2.19] [-1.84] [-2.22] [-2.30] [-2.27] [-2.24] [-2.01] [-0.41] 
iscoh 0.017 0.0224 0.0171 0.0149 0.0156 0.016 0.0222 -0.00044 
 [1.55] [1.10] [1.40] [1.31] [1.33] [1.39] [1.07] [-0.041] 
iscoh(t-2) 0.00453 0.00703 0.00302 0.00994 0.00906 0.00771 0.0207 0.018 
 [0.44] [0.35] [0.28] [0.83] [0.77] [0.66] [0.97] [1.44] 
idem 0.0371 0.0269 0.0361 0.0408 0.0411 0.0384 0.0302 -0.134* 
 [0.96] [0.60] [0.95] [1.08] [1.07] [1.02] [0.69] [-1.73] 
yv -0.0289 -0.0731** -0.0292 -0.0303 -0.0278 -0.0256 -0.0728** -0.00667 
 [-0.70] [-2.33] [-0.72] [-0.75] [-0.69] [-0.63] [-2.39] [-0.077] 
isreg×yo 0.567*** 0.48 0.544*** 0.519*** 0.397*** 0.357*** 0.294 1.149*** 
 [3.34] [1.58] [3.17] [3.09] [2.92] [2.80] [1.21] [2.70] 
br×yo -0.604** -0.57 -0.726*** -0.627*** -0.566*** -0.593** -0.468 -0.983 
 [-2.32] [-0.91] [-2.73] [-2.63] [-2.65] [-2.50] [-0.94] [-1.16] 
xh×yo -0.213 -0.187 -0.238* -0.232* -0.21    
 [-1.30] [-0.51] [-1.80] [-1.68] [-1.56]    
iscor×yo -0.134 -0.191 -0.175 -0.149     
 [-1.18] [-0.63] [-1.37] [-1.21]     
iscoh×yo 0.526 1.409 0.611      
 [0.95] [1.35] [1.33]      
sw1×yo -1.144 -2.16       
 [-0.52] [-0.98]       
idem×yo -0.0484 0.00356       
 [-0.27] [0.010]       
yv×yo 0.062 0.137       
 [0.18] [0.24]       
isgini        0.00296 
        [0.18] 
isgini×yo        0.151 
        [0.68] 
Constant -0.00343**  -0.00354** -0.00354** -0.00369** -0.00374**  0.00124 
 [-2.38]  [-2.36] [-2.37] [-2.40] [-2.36]  [0.29] 
No of obs. 295 331 295 295 295 295 331 114 
No of countries 26 29 26 26 26 26 29 22 
Avg no of years 11.35 11.41 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.41 5.182 
J-statistics 250.3 x 251 249 248.9 249 x 96.7 
Sargan’ s p-val. 0.920 x 0.915 0.930 0.929 0.928 x 1.000 
m1 -3.534 x -3.487 -3.513 -3.505 -3.522 x -2.665 
m2 1.388 x 1.435 1.454 1.48 1.478 x 1.713 
m3 -1.052 x -1.06 -1.039 -0.991 -0.949 x -1.371 
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Table 5 Estimation results – robustness checks 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Method GMM FE-BC GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Dep. var. sl sl sw sw sw sw sw sw 
sl(t-1) 0.764*** 0.847***       
 [13.6] [16.3]       
sl(t-2) 0.0165        
 [0.21]        
sw(t-1)   0.00774 0.485*** 0.269* 0.807*** 0.651*** -0.177 
   [0.045] [3.30] [1.93] [9.89] [7.21] [-1.21] 
sw   0.0311 0.134 -0.125 -0.00874 -0.00594 -0.255*** 
   [0.36] [1.04] [-1.29] [-0.080] [-0.077] [-6.44] 
yo 1.527*** 1.469*** 0.214 1.558*** 0.683 1.154*** 1.331*** 0.813 
 [9.20] [4.73] [0.32] [8.05] [1.54] [7.86] [11.0] [0.92] 
yo(t-1) -0.857*** -1.023*** 0.853 -0.361* -0.413 -0.776*** -0.459*** -0.701 
 [-5.49] [-6.70] [1.31] [-1.94] [-1.20] [-3.77] [-2.88] [-1.53] 
br(t-1) 0.0416 -0.00904 0.00245 0.147* 0.026 0.0570* 0.137*** -0.585*** 
 [0.97] [-0.29] [0.022] [1.89] [0.36] [1.73] [3.53] [-4.22] 
pi(t-1) 0.13 0.0988 -0.189 0.306 0.262* 0.0746 0.035 0.753** 
 [1.24] [0.63] [-0.55] [1.30] [1.72] [0.61] [0.32] [2.57] 
xh 0.0434 -0.00681 1.486*** 0.325*** -0.160** 0.048 0.0828 0.456 
 [0.79] [-0.10] [2.78] [3.20] [-2.17] [0.95] [1.22] [1.02] 
isreg 0.0392*** 0.0272** -0.0697 0.0628** 0.0302 0.0446*** 0.0123 0.165*** 
 [3.03] [2.03] [-1.11] [2.51] [1.27] [3.15] [0.89] [3.73] 
iscor 0.0444** 0.0420** 0.00308 -0.0009 0.0414* 0.0376* 0.0157 0.125*** 
 [1.99] [2.05] [0.053] [-0.072] [1.67] [1.71] [1.53] [3.52] 
iscor(t-1) -0.0429** -0.0451** 0 -0.0505 -0.00392 -0.0438** -0.0177** -0.0281 
 [-2.39] [-2.28] [] [-1.22] [-0.29] [-2.37] [-1.99] [-0.68] 
iscoh 0.00441 0.00986 0.0988 0.0460*** 0.00589 -0.00647 0.0177* -0.0348 
 [0.36] [0.55] [1.09] [3.36] [0.39] [-1.34] [1.96] [-0.31] 
iscoh(t-2) 0.00971 0.0161 -0.0267 -0.00933 0.0221 -0.00863 0.0109* -0.181* 
 [0.85] [0.88] [-0.26] [-0.86] [1.48] [-0.19] [1.72] [-1.83] 
idem 0.0627* 0.0457 0.075 0.033 0.136* 0.141 -0.0179 0.497 
 [1.65] [1.16] [0.38] [0.39] [1.76] [1.36] [-0.87] [1.57] 
yv -0.0263 -0.0554** 0.311** -0.155 0.0218 -0.0154 0.0317 -1.938** 
 [-0.81] [-2.14] [2.40] [-1.30] [0.17] [-0.47] [0.85] [-1.99] 
isreg×yo 0.384*** 0.373* 1.181** 0.786*** 1.378*** 0.431*** 0.284** 5.581*** 
 [3.39] [1.76] [2.40] [4.07] [4.95] [2.77] [1.99] [2.96] 
br×yo -0.924*** -0.808* 1.27 -1.360*** -0.633 -0.504*** -0.802*** -1.377 
 [-3.99] [-1.80] [1.08] [-3.52] [-1.02] [-2.92] [-4.72] [-0.53] 
Constant -0.00218  -0.00726 -0.00197 -0.00471 -0.00539*** -0.00266 -0.0336 
 [-1.42]  [-0.90] [-0.31] [-0.84] [-2.77] [-1.58] [-0.89] 
No of obs. 295 331 45 117 133 224 222 30 
No of countries 26 29 12 14 26 14 15 8 
Avg no of years 11.35 11.41 3.75 8.357 5.115 16 14.8 3.75 
J-statistics 246.9 x 24.59 110.4 102.7 205.5 206.6 9.811 
Sargan’ s p-val. 0.940 x 1.000 0.924 0.135 1.000 1.000 1.000 
m1 -3.506 x -2.856 -2.886 -2.987 -2.765 -3.117 -2.044 
m2 0.513 x 0.0393 -0.198 1.879 0.743 1.897 1.221 
m3 -0.193 x -0.997 1.374 -1.285 -0.91 -0.145 -1.414 
 
